Attributing minds to vampires in Richard Matheson’s I Am Legend by Nuttall, Louise
Nuttall, Louise (2015) Attributing minds to vampires in 
Richard Matheson’s I Am Legend. Language and 
Literature, 24 (1). pp. 23-39. ISSN 0963-9470 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28744/1/Attributing%20minds%20to%20vampires%20in
%20Richard%20Matheson%27s%20I%20Am%20Legend%20%28v2%29.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
 1 
 
 This is a preprint version of the citable published paper. The actual published version 
PD\EHVRPHZKDWGLIIHUHQWGXHWRHGLWRUV¶FRUUHFWLRQVDQGDGGLWLRQDOPRGLILFDWLRQVAll 
citations, quotes and page references should be from the published version. 
 
 
Attributing minds to vampires LQ5LFKDUG0DWKHVRQ¶VI Am Legend 
 
Abstract 
For Palmer (2004, 2010), and other proponents of a cognitive narratology, research into real-world minds 
in the cognitive sciences provides insights into UHDGHUV¶ experiences of fictional minds. In this article, I 
explore the application of such research to the minds constructed for the vampire characters in Richard 
0DWKHVRQ¶VVFLHQFHILFWLRQKRUURUQRYHOI Am Legend.  ,GUDZXSRQHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKLQWRµPLQG
DWWULEXWLRQ¶LQVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\and apply Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 2008), and its notion of 
µconstrual¶, as a framework for the application of such findings to narrative. In my analysis, I suggest that 
UHDGHUV¶DWWULEXWLRQof mental-states to the vampireVLQ0DWKHVRQ¶Vnovel is strategically limited through a 
number of choices in their linguistic construal. Drawing on online reader responses to the novel, I argue 
WKDWUHDGHUV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVHother minds plays an important role in their empathetic experience 
and their ethical judgement RIWKHQRYHO¶VPDLQFKDUDFWHr and focaliser, Robert Neville. Finally, I suggest 
that the limited mind attribution for the vampires invited through their construal contributes to the 
presentation of a µmind style¶)RZOHU for this character.  
 
Keywords 
Fictional minds, mind attribution, Cognitive Grammar, construal, empathy, ethics, intermentality, mind 
style, I Am Legend, Matheson. 
 
1 Introduction  
In cognitive approaches to literature our processing of fictional minds and real-world 
minds are said to share fundamental similarities (Herman, 2003, 2009, 2013; Palmer, 
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2004, 2010; Zunshine, 2006). While fiction might be set apart from real-life in allowing 
readers privileged, intimate access to µWUDQVSDUHQWPLQGV¶ through forms of 
consciousness representation (Cohn, 1978), much of our experience of fictional minds ± 
as for real minds ± comes from simply observing them in action. For example, despite 
the absence of any linguistic representation of thoughts or perceptions for the characters 
in the sentence The girl chased the cat into the road and the driver skidded to a 
screeching halt, we can still infer mental-states for each of them (e.g. innocent 
unawareness for the girl and shock for the driver). Not only are we able to construct 
these minds, but this construction is crucial to our understanding of the causality of the 
events portrayed, and their contribution to a plot. For Palmer (2004), this observation 
presents a challenge for analysts of literatureµ:e need to look more closely at the sets 
of instructions that relate to mental functioning in fictional WH[WV¶2004: 12). Previous 
approaches in narratology, he argues, including those dealing with focalisation, 
characterisation and (in)direct representations RIWKRXJKWIDLOWRDGGXSWRDµcomplete 
and coherent study¶ of fictional minds (2004: 12). Palmer proposes that we broaden our 
study of fictional minds by taking into account cognitive scientific research into aspects 
of real-ZRUOGPLQGVWKDWDUHµRXWHUDFWLYHSXEOLFVRFLDOEHKDYLRUDOHYLGHQWHmbodied, 
DQGHQJDJHG¶RUZKDWKHUHIHUVWRFROOHFWLYHO\DVsocial minds (2010: 39).  
In this article, I explore the application of such a broadened understanding of 
fictional minds, and its significance for UHDGHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVRI5LFKDUG0DWKHVRQ¶V
(1954) science fiction/horror novel I Am Legend.  My analysis of this text, DQGWKHµVHWV
RILQVWUXFWLRQV¶through which it manipulates the minds constructed for its characters, 
draws upon research into our everyday attribution of real-world minds in social 
psychology, the stylistic application of which to narrative is supported using the 
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IUDPHZRUNRIµFRQVWUXDO¶LQCognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008). 
Through this analysis, I suggest that UHDGHUV¶DWWULEXWLRQs of mental-states to the vampire 
characters in I Am Legend are strategically limited through a number of choices in their 
linguistic construal, and that this manipulation of mind attribution contributes to an 
HPSDWKHWLFH[SHULHQFHRIWKHQRYHO¶VPDLQFKDUDFWHUDQGIRFDOLVHURobert Neville, and 
the impact of the dramatic plot twist found at its conclusion. Furthermore, I suggest that, 
when attributed to the focalised perspective of Neville, the limited engagement with 
other minds invited at key points in the narrative contributes to the impression of a 
µPLQGVW\OH¶IRUWKLV character (Fowler, 1977). 
Before presenting my analysis of several extracts from I Am Legend, in the 
following three sections I firstly introduce the novel and the characters under 
consideration, the empirical work in social psychology which provides the background 
for my analysis, and the cognitive grammatical framework through which it will be 
applied.  
 
2 I Am Legend 
5LFKDUG0DWKHVRQ¶V>@ novel I Am Legend portrays a world in which 
a mysterious virus has transformed the population into murderous vampires. The story 
has seen numerous film adaptations, including The Omega Man (1971) and I Am 
Legend (2007), and is often regarded as a significant milestone in horror and Gothic 
fiction (Oakes, 2000; Clasen, 2010: 313).  
5REHUW1HYLOOHWKHQRYHO¶V main protagonist, is µWKHODVWPDQRQ(DUWK¶
(Matheson, 2001: 94), and engaged in a constant struggle for survival: trapped and 
preyed upon by hordes of vampires in his barricaded Los Angeles home by night, 
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hunting and killing dormant vampires by day. In the course of the narrative, Neville 
attempts to uncover the scientific cause of the pandemic, carrying out experiments on 
infected individuals which lead WRDQLQFUHDVLQJXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHYDULRXVµOLYLQJ¶
DQGµGHDG¶YDULHWLHVDQGPRUHefficient ways of destroying them. After three years, 
Neville meets an apparently uninfected woman, Ruth, who ultimately reveals her true 
identity as a vampire and spy, sent to observe him. In the final 30 pages of the novel, 
during which Neville is captured and imprisoned, Ruth explains that the vampires have 
developed medication to allow them to live with their disease and have begun to build a 
new society. For the members of this society, Neville is a killer who comes by day to 
destroy their loved ones; a source of terror and superstition. The novel closes with 
1HYLOOH¶VWUDQVIRUPHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHYDPSLUHV¶WKRXJKWVDQGIHHOLQJVDVKHORRNV
out of his cell window and faces his execution.  
 Readers often report an empathetic relationship with this main character, whose 
loss of his wife and daughter to the virus is portrayed in a flashback part-way though the 
novel)RU5REHUW%ORFKµ0DWKHVRQ¶VVNLOODWFUHDWLQJHPSDWK\OHQGVVSHFLDOVWUHQJWKWR
KLVZRUN¶ (cited in Wiater, 1998: 12), while Clasen (2010) attributes its psychological 
realism and resulting empathy WRWKHµLQWXLWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKXPDQQDWXUH¶ZKLFK
Matheson invokes in his readers (315). Supporting such analysis, the most frequent 
reader response in online reviews of the novel on the book recommendation website 
Goodreads (2014) concerns the impact of this empathetic experience. One reviewer 
writes: 
 
The novel had me so tense in places that I was almost screaming out at the pages 
of the book. I felt the main characters pain, solitude and deep sadness at the loss 
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of his love, life and the horrific existence he now endured. (Patricia Smith, 
Goodreads, 2014)¹ 
 
More broadly, rHDGHUVUHSRUWDIHHOLQJRIµVXVSHQVH¶DQGµKRUURU¶DORQJVLGHWKLV
FKDUDFWHUGXULQJWKHLUUHDGLQJRIWKHWH[WDQGµVXUSULVH¶DWWKHnew perspective revealed 
in its ending (e.g. Marius Dawes, Goodreads, 2014). Significantly, this character 
appears to invite empathy even as aspects of his personality are observed that are 
unlikeable. Readers often describe strong negative feelings towards this character, his 
angry outbursts and apparently sexist attitudes in particular, which render the 
empathetic experience invited by Matheson an uncomfortable one. Patricia Smith 
JRHVRQWRFRPPHQWµDespite that I found it hard to like him. Maybe I wasn't 
VXSSRVHWROLNHKLP¶VLFZKLle another reader observes that 
 
from what I can tell, its peoples' views on the Neville character that polarize the 
reviews so much. People who love the book like being in Neville's head. People 
who hate it can't stand being in Neville's head. I fell into the latter category. 
(Grace S, Goodreads, 2014) 
 
Such empathy for Robert Neville can be related to the internal focalisation of this 
character in the 3rd person throughout the narrative, and the representation of his beliefs, 
perceptions and emotions through direct, indirect and free indirect thought. Forms of 
access to the inner life of a character have long been regarded in narratology as a 
significant device for the facilitation of empathy (e.g. see van Peer and Pander Maat, 
2001: 230; Keen, 2006: 219-220). Booth (1987: 278), for example, DUJXHGWKDWµLQVLGH
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YLHZVFDQEXLOGV\PSDWK\HYHQIRUWKHPRVWYLFLRXVFKDUDFWHU¶For Leech and Short 
(2007: 277) forms such as free indirect thought and direct thought, in particular, 
UHSUHVHQWDGHSDUWXUHIURPWKHµQRUP¶IRUWKRXJKWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ(indirect thought) 
which invites a sense of increased vividness in our access to the mind of a character and 
a movement towards empathetic alignment. In the opening chapter of the novel, these 
forms of consciousness representation soon reveal the characteristic frustration and 
sarcasm with which Neville confronts his daily H[LVWHQFHµAfter violent attacks, the 
planks were often split or partially pried off, and he had to replace them completely; a 
job he hated. Today only one plank ZDVORRVH,VQ¶WWKDWDPazing? he thought¶ 
(Matheson, 2001: 7). 
               Forms of consciousness representation might be further analysed in terms of 
WKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQWRUHDGHUV¶FRPSOH[HPSDWKHWLc experience of this character. Also 
significant, however, and my focus in this article, are the minds constructed for the 
other characters in this fictional world: the vampires responsible for these attacks. 
Though focalised externally through Neville, following Palmer¶V) approach, the 
pUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHVHFKDUDFWHUV¶EHKDYLRXUcan be seen to initiate mind construction in 
readers. In the following section I introduce research in social psychology through 
which the attribution of minds to these characters, and its consequences for UHDGHUV¶
experiences of the fictional world, might be understood in greater detail.  
 
3 Real minds 
Since the seminal psychological study by Heider and Simmel (1944), our ability to 
attribute mental-states to behaviour has been recognised as an important means through 
which we impose structure on experience, without which the interactions between 
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entities around us, and by extension those in fiction, would appear random and 
incomprehensible. The mechanisms underlying this attribution of mind, however, are 
far from agreed upon in the cognitive sciences. In one influential account, a process of 
µPLQGUHDGLQJ¶or µPHQWDOL]LQJ¶ is underpinned by an innate, specialised ability known 
DVµ7KHRU\RI0LQG¶, reliant on folk psychological knowledge or a simulative capacity 
(e.g. Malle and Hodges, 2005).  Recently, the existence of this inferential capacity has 
been questioned, with more basic enacted or socio-cultural mechanisms proposed, and 
the teUPµ7KHRU\RI0LQG¶GLVFRXUDJHG in favour of broader terms such as 
µLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶=Oatev et al., 2008). Carrying such ongoing debates with it, the 
application of this concept to literature faces a number of potential problems (as 
discussed by Belmonte, 2008; Stockwell, 2009: 140; Palmer, 2011: 209). 
A more immediately productive area of research for the investigation of fictional 
minds, I propose, is that concerned with the factors affecting this process, or the 
cognitive phenomenon that is here generally termed µmind attribution¶. Categories of 
entities differ in terms of the type of mind that we typically attribute to them: human 
beings are usually perceived as having more complex mental lives than animals or 
robots. However, as research in social psychology shows, our attribution of mind is 
highly variable and somewhat subjective. To some extentµPLQGLVLQWKHH\e of the 
SHUFHLYHU¶:D\W] et al., 2010a: 384). Moreover, mind attribution is not a binary 
situation, but a continuum with varying degrees of richness and complexity (Haslam et 
al., 2005; Morewedge et al., 2007). Studies have shown that SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ positioning of 
an entity along this continuum (usually measured by ratings of mental-states such as 
µIHHOVSDLQ¶µSRVVHVVHVEHOLHIV¶HWFDORQJDSRLQWVFDOHis influenced by a range of 
factors. As my analysis will demonstrate, many of these factors, including the 
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perceptual features of the entity in question, and the knowledge, motivations and 
attentional dispositions of the perceiver, are directly applicable to our conceptual 
experiences of fictional characters.  
Social psychology also offers insights for the consequences of mind attribution. 
Neuroscientific research suggests that our attribution of mental-states is closely related 
to our experience of empathy (Hooker et al., 2008). ,Q+RGJHVDQG:HJQHU¶V
model, empathy is a state of mind that may be automatically stimulated by mental-state 
µFXHV¶LQRXUHQYLURQPHQW. Significantly, these cues may be perceptual (e.g. seeing 
someone crying), or conceptual ± located in our knowledge and experiences (e.g. a 
personal memory of pain). Following this view, it is a desire to avoid a vicarious 
sharing of thoughts and feelings that causes me to look away from a murder scene in a 
horror film (or put down a horror novel) ± to divert attention away from the cues for 
mind attribution and opportunity for empathy with the suffering it presents.  
 The richness of the mental-states we attribute also has important consequences 
for our ethical judgements (Gray et al., 2007). In everyday life, many sensitive ethical 
debates about the rights and responsibilities of individuals in society centre on matters 
of mind attribution. For example, positions on animal rights and abortion often hinge on 
the degree to which the animal or foetus is attributed some kind of consciousness. 
Through empirical study, researchers in social psychology have shown that our 
attribution of mental-states is bound-up with our basic appreciation of ethics (Gray et 
al., 2012).  
 
4 Mind construal 
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In fiction, a significant source of cues for the attribution of mental-states, according to 
Palmer (2004), is the observation of characters in action. Language offers writers a 
range of choices for the description of actions, varying in the extent to which the 
motives and feelings which underlie them are made prominent ZLWKLQWKHUHDGHU¶V
attention: 
 
In the case of a death by shooting, do you define the action of the killer as the 
twitching of the finger, the pulling of the trigger, the firing of the gun, the killing 
of a person or the murdering of a person? These descriptions differ to the extent 
to which they ascribe consciousness to the agent, take account of the 
consequences of the physical movement, and assign responsibility to the agent 
for those consequences. (Palmer, 2004: 119) 
 
Applying Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008), such descriptions reflect 
our capacity for construal, or µRXUPDQLIHVWDELOLW\WRFRQFHLYHDQGSRUWUD\the same 
situation in alternate ways¶Langacker, 2008: 43). In Cognitive Grammar, our linguistic 
portrayal of a situation is said to draw upon the same mechanisms involved in our wider 
embodied cognition, including DWWHQWLRQDOSURFHVVLQJLQYLVXDOSHUFHSWLRQµIn viewing a 
scene¶/DQJDFNHUREVHUYHV µwhat we actually see depends on how closely we examine 
it, what we choose to look at, which elements we pay most attention to, and where we 
view it from¶ (2008: 55). These choices, termed specificity, focusing, prominence and 
perspective respectivelyDUHµDSSOLFDEOe to cRQFHSWLRQVLQDQ\GRPDLQ¶, including the 
conceptualisations formed by producers and receivers of language. This model of 
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construal has been shown to be particularly applicable to our mental representations of 
literary texts (Stockwell, 2009; Herman, 2009; Harrison et al., 2014).  
               One important way in which construals differ, I propose, is in the degree of 
mind attribution prompted in readers. ,Q3DOPHU¶VµVKRRWLQJ¶ examples, these construals 
differ in terms of the portion of the action which readers are invited to attend to ± or 
their variable profiling of an action chain for this event (Langacker, 2008: 356). In other 
words, the linguistic construal of an action constitutes a µVHWRILQVWUXFWLRQV¶(Palmer, 
2004) for readers¶ ascriptions of a fictional mind as part of their conceptualisation of a 
scene (cf. /DQJDFNHU¶V(2008: 460) description of construals as discursive 
µLQVWUXFWLRQV¶).  
             It has been argued that cognitive developments in literary study are in danger of 
neglecting the textual focus at the heart of stylistics (Gavins and Stockwell, 2012). 
Rundquist (2014: 161), for example, views the discussion of fictional minds in terms of 
UHDOPLQGVDVµGHSULRULWL]LQJWKHPHFKDQLFVDQGHIIHFWVRIOLQJXLVWLFYDULDWLRQVLn their 
WH[WXDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶Extending the dialogue with the cognitive sciences in a linguistic 
direction offers one means of addressing such concerns. By presenting a direct link 
between linguistic choices and our embodied attentional processing of our real-world 
HQYLURQPHQWWKHGLPHQVLRQVRIµFRQVWUXDO¶PRGHOOHGLQ&RJQLWLYH*UDPPDURIIHUD
structured framework for application of the factors affecting mind attribution in social 
psychology to the linguistic construction of fictional minds.  
              In the following section I explore the application of such research to UHDGHUV¶ 
attribution of minds to the vampires in I Am Legend, and its consequences for their 
experience of its main character. 
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5 Attributing minds to vampires 
5.1 Limited mind attribution and empathy 
              A basic factor affecting our psychological judgements of other entities 
observed in social psychology is the presence of anthropomorphic features, i.e. the 
extent to which the entity looks or acts like a human and more specifically, our human-
protoW\SHRXUVHOYHV,QSDUWLFXODUFHUWDLQNLQGVRIµVHOI-SURSHOOHG¶motion DQGµJRDO-
GLUHFWHG¶action seem to act as strong cues for the attribution of rich mental-states 
(Premack and Premack, 1997; Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Morewedge et al., 2007). In 
the opening chapter of I Am Legend, 0DWKHVRQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHYDPSLUHV¶behaviour 
and appearance backgrounds or reduces attention to these mental-state cues within the 
conceptualisation invited in the reader. 
           One ZD\LQZKLFKUHDGHUV¶ attention to these cues is reduced in this opening 
chapter is through what Langacker terms µsubjective construal¶). In the 
subjective construal of the vampires seen in extracts (1) and (2), our attention to the 
µREMHFWRIFRQFHSWLRQ¶ (the vamSLUHVRXWVLGH1HYLOOH¶VKRXVH) is distracted by the 
prominent µRQVWDJH¶SUHVHQFHRIthe µsubject¶ of this conception (Neville, who sits 
indoors trying to ignore them): 
 
(1) 
From the speaker over the hallway door, the music of Schönberg was playing 
loudly.  
      Not loudly enough, though. He still heard them outside, their murmuring and 
their walkings about and their cries, their snarling and fighting among 
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themselves. Once in a while a rock or brick thudded off the house. Sometimes a 
dog barked.  
      And they were all there for the same thing. (Matheson, 2001: 12) 
(2) 
[T]KHVLOHQFHGLGQ¶WUHDOO\KHOS+HFRXOGVWLOOVHHWKHPRXWWKHUHWKHZKLWH-
faced men prowling around his house, looking ceaselessly for a way to get in at 
him. Some of them, probably, crouching on their haunches like dogs, eyes 
glittering at the house, teeth slowly grating together; back and forth, back and 
forth. (Matheson, 2001: 16) 
 
The description of the vampires in both passages can be described as instances of 
µVXPPDU\¶ZULWLQJDQGµLWHUDWLYHIUHTXHQF\¶Genette, 1988), in which story events 
inferred as taking place over an extended period of time are compressed into a single 
impression in the thoughts of this character. Analysed using Cognitive Grammar, such 
descriptions can be considered in terms of their effects upon the attentional processing 
of the reader. Use of the present participles µPXUPXULQJ¶µVQDUOLQJDQGILJKWLQJDPRQJ
WKHPVHOYHV¶ (1), µSURZOLQJ¶µORRNLQJFHDVHOHVVO\¶µFURXFKLQJ¶µJOLWWHULQJ¶µJUDWLQJ¶ 
(2), the temporal DGYHUEVµRQFHLQZKLOH¶ µVRPHWLPHV¶ (1), the quantifier µVRPHRIWKHP¶ 
(2), and nominalisations µZDONLQJVDERXW¶µFULHV¶1), all invite the reader to 
conceptualise the vampires¶EHKDYLRXU WKURXJKDSURFHVVRIµVXPPDU\VFDQQLQJ¶
(Langacker, 2008: 111). In Cognitive Grammar, this involves examining multiple 
targets in a cumulative manner, building up to a gestalt conception which is 
apprehended whole, and provides an alternative to µVHTXHQWLDOVFDQQLQJ¶ (the 
prototypical means through which we track events through real-time).  
 13 
           By inviting readers to apprehend WKHYDPSLUHV¶DFWLRQVin this way, this construal 
can be said to µDWHPSRUDOL]H¶ these processes and reduce attention to their component 
states DVSDUWRIDQµDWWHQXDWHG¶VLPXODWLRQ(Langacker, 2008: 537). In addition, the 
present participle form is said to present a µlimited scope¶ on the process conceptualised, 
which excludes the source and goal of the action (or agent and patient) from its 
conceptualisation (2008: 120). Consequently, instead of conceptualising WKHYDPSLUHV¶ 
self-propelled, goal-directed behaviour directly, we are invited to experience it as 
Neville does from inside the house: as a vague, ongoing, holistic impression in the 
background of our focused attention. Through its manipulation of reader attention, I 
propose, this subjective construal of the vampires suppresses the cues for mind 
attribution that their behaviour presents, and hence limits UHDGHUV¶ understanding of the 
YDPSLUHV¶ actions in terms of thoughts, feelings and motivations.  
            Another basic factor in our attributions of mind is our pre-existing categorical 
knowledge and expectations of the entities involved (e.g. Gray et al., 2007). A further 
potential limitation of reader mind attribution in this opening chapter is through a lack 
of µspecificity¶ VHHQLQWKHYDPSLUHV¶ construal (Langacker, 2008: 55). The vampires are 
first referred to using the pronoun µWKH\¶, which lacking an antecedent, cues an 
indistinct, undetailed conceptualisation of these characters in the mind of the reader. 
This gradually gains in granularity as the chapter progresses through references to 
µILOWK\EDVWDUGV¶Matheson, 2001: µWKHZRPHQ¶p. µPHQ¶p. 16), before µWKH\¶ 
DUHILQDOO\UHVROYHGDVµYDPSLUHV¶ in chapter two (p. 21). This is significant as, once 
specified, UHDGHUV¶DWWULEXWLRQof minds for these characters will draw on their schematic 
knowledge of such fictional entities and their associated emotions, or what we might 
term, following Culpeper (2001), their vampire schema. By delaying such naming, 
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0DWKHVRQFDQEHVHHQWRDGGDQHOHPHQWRIXQFHUWDLQW\WRUHDGHUV¶understanding of 
these characters in the opening chapter. Although readers may suspect, through 
inferencing, WKDWWKHµWKLQJ¶WKH\DUHµWKHUHIRU¶in extract (1) is to kill Neville, they are 
given little opportunity to confirm this attributed intention at this point in the novel, nor 
gain any kind of rich understanding of the thoughts and feelings which accompany it.  
           Once activated, this schema is not straightforward in terms of expectations of 
mind. The vampire µYLRODWHVRXULQWXLWLYHH[SHFWDWLRQVRIELRORJLFDODJHQWVDQGEOXUV
WKHWD[RQRPLFOLQHEHWZHHQKXPDQDQGDQLPDO¶&ODVHQ, 2010: 324). Moreover, 
0DWKHVRQ¶VVFLHQFHILFWLRQDODGDSWDWLRQRIWKLVP\WKdisrupts such culturally-acquired 
NQRZOHGJH:KLOH6WRNHU¶V'UDFXODVDWLULFDOO\FDVWDVLGHZLWKLQWKH narrative 
(Matheson, 2001: 23), is cunning and passionate, MDWKHVRQ¶VYDPSLUes are more 
ambiguously mindedDV1HYLOOH¶VRZQDWWHPSWVDWPLQGDWWULEXWLRQsuggest:  µ:K\
GLGQ¶WWKH\OHDYHKLPDORQH"'LGWKH\WKLQNWKH\FRXOGall have him? Were they so 
VWXSLGWKH\WKRXJKWWKDW":K\GLGWKH\NHHSFRPLQJHYHU\QLJKW"¶p. 14).  
             In social psychology, mind attribution is motivated by our desire for 
µHIIHFWDQFH¶RUDVHQVHRIµXQGHUVWDQGLQJSUHGLFWDELOLW\DQGFRQWURORYHURQH¶V
HQYLURQPHQW¶:D\W]et al., 2010b: 412).  In the opening chapter of I Am Legend, 
disruptions of reader mind attribution, I suggest, play a significant role in the 
establishment of an empathetic relationship with Neville, by contributing to a felt lack 
of effectance alongside this character. The unfocused and non-specific construals of 
these figures though the mind of this character, and the uncertainty this evokes, can be 
seen to contribute to the experience of µVXVSHQVH¶ZKLFKthe Goodreads (2014) readers 
describe in relation to this text, and the fear which characterises it as µhorror¶. 
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           As the text continues, this lack of certainty as to the nature and richness of the 
mental-states of the vampires is maintained. As Neville learns more about their 
condition, the mental lives of these characters (and their taxonomic categorisation) 
comes increasingly into question: µDOOWKHOLYLQJZKRFDPHWRKLVKRXVHDWQLJKWZHUH
insane, thinking themselves true vampires although actually they were only demented 
VXIIHUHUV¶Matheson, 2001: 109). In addition, linguistic choices in their construal 
continue to disrupt mind attribution in readers. Extracts from the narrative in which 
such limited mind attribution has particular significance, analysed in the following 
section, DUHWKRVHLQZKLFK1HYLOOH¶VDFWLRQVtowards the vampires are raised for ethical 
TXHVWLRQLQJ,QVXFKVFHQHVDQWLFLSDWLQJWKHQRYHO¶VFRQFOXVLRQ0DWKHVRQ¶VVWUDWHJLF
PDQLSXODWLRQRIPLQGDWWULEXWLRQKDVIXUWKHUFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUUHDGHUV¶H[SHULHQFHRI
this main character.  
 
5.2 Conflicting mind attribution and ethics 
 In extract (3), the description of 1HYLOOH¶Vdestruction of living vampires reveals his 
doubts regarding the logic and morality of his actions (underlining added for ease of 
reference in my analysis): 
 
(3) 
     There were two of them. In the living room, lying on a couch, was a woman 
about thirty years old, wearing a red housecoat. Her chest rose and fell slowly as 
she lay there, eyes closed, her hands clasped over her stomach.  
     5REHUW1HYLOOH¶VKDQGVIXPEOHGRQWhe stake and mallet. It was always hard 
when they were alive; especially with women. He could feel that senseless 
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demand returning again, tightening his muscles. He forced it down. It was 
insane, there was no rational argument for it. 
     She made no sound except for a sudden, hoarse intake of breath. As he 
walked into the bedroom, he could hear a sound like the sound of water running. 
Well, what else can I do? he asked himself, for he still had to convince himself 
he was doing the right thing. 
     He stood in the bedroom doorway, staring at the small bed by the window, 
his throat moving, breath shuddering in his chest. Then, driven on, he walked to 
the side of the bed and looked down at her. 
   Why do they all look like Kathy to me? he thought, drawing out the second 
stake with shaking hands. (Matheson, 2001: 20, underlining added). 
 
Suppression of mental-state cues for the vampires is seen here through the reduced 
attention invited to their role as the object or goal RI1HYLOOH¶VDFWLRQV. 1HYLOOH¶Vkilling 
of the woman and child is presented intransitively, through goal-less references to the 
µinstruments¶ involved in this material action process: µWKHVWDNHDQGPDOOHW¶, µWKH
VHFRQGVWDNH¶, and 1HYLOOH¶Vµhands¶, which take the place of Neville himself as a form 
RIµPHURQ\PLFDJHQF\¶(Simpson, 2004: 76). Similarly, following this passage we learn 
WKDWµ$IWHUOXQFKKHZHQWIURPKRXVHWRKRXVHDQGXVHGXSDOOKLVVWDNHV+HKDGIRUW\
VHYHQVWDNHV¶Matheson, 2001: 22). Applying Cognitive Grammar, these descriptions 
can be said WRUHVWULFWUHDGHUV¶DWWHQWLRQWRDVSHFLILFSRrtion of the µaction chain¶ 
conceptualised here, in a restricted µprofile¶ which excludes (or backgrounds) the 
µagent¶, µpatient¶ and µWUDMHFWRU\¶RI this self-propelled, goal-directed activity 
(Langacker, 2008: 356). In particular, the vampires are extremely non-prominent 
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participants in this scene ± WKHVRXQGVRIWKHZRPDQ¶VJULVO\GHDWKare presented 
indirectly in the third paragraph through negation and simile: µQRVRXQGH[FHSW¶, µD
VRXQGOLNHWKHVRXQGRIZDWHUUXQQLQJ¶, while the young girl must be inferred from 
references WRµVPDOOEHG¶µKHU¶and a FRPSDULVRQZLWK1HYLOOH¶VORVWGDXJKWHUµKathy¶ 
in the final two paragraphs. Through such attentional backgrounding, the mental-states 
which underlie this action ± the intentions, sexual desires and perhaps even enjoyment 
of this violence by Neville, and the thoughts and feelings of the vampires as its 
recipients ± are less likely to be perceived, and to a lesser degree of richness. 
              This passage reflects another factor affecting mind attribution. In social 
SV\FKRORJ\VWXGLHVLQWRµREMHFWLILFDWLRQ¶KDYHVKRZQWKDWIRFXVHGDWWHQWLRQXSRQWKH
bodies of individuals (e.g. women in the media) reduces the complexity of the mental-
states attributed to them (Loughnan et al., 2010; Gray et al., 2011). Broadly speaking, 
µREMHFWLILFDWLRQ¶PLJKWperhaps be associated with the effects of meronymic agency, e.g. 
the DFWLRQVRIWKHYDPSLUHV¶µH\HV¶DQGµWHHWK¶LQextract (2). In (3) the extensive 
attentional focusing on the body of the woman (µFKHVW¶µH\HV¶µKDQGV¶µVWRPDFK¶ in the 
first paragraph) and Neville (KDQGV¶µPXVFOHV¶µWKURDW¶µFKHVW¶ throughout) also reflects 
1HYLOOH¶VµVHQVHOHVV¶ desire for this woman. Such attentional focussing of body parts, 
and the reduced mind attribution it invites for both Neville and the vampires, is found in 
other morally-problematic scenes within the text, such as those in which Neville is 
experimenting on female vampires (4), or contemplating killing them (5): 
 
(4) 
Her hands closed over his wrists and her body began to twist and flop on the rug. 
Her eyes were still closed, but she gasped and muttered and her body kept trying 
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to writhe out of his grip. Her dark nails dug into his flesh (...) Usually he felt a 
twinge ZKHQKHUHDOLVHGWKDWEXWIRUVRPHDIIOLFWLRQKHGLGQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGWKHVH
people were the same as he. But now an experimental fervor had seized him and 
he could think of nothing else. (Matheson, 2001: 34, underlining added) 
(5) 
His eyes ran over the robe, resting a moment on the slight prominence of her 
breasts, dropping then to the bronzed carves and ankles, up to the smooth 
kneecaps. She had a body OLNHD\RXQJJLUO¶V6KHFHUWDLQO\GLGQ¶Wlook like the 
mother of two. (Matheson, 2001: 126, underlining added) 
          
            0DWKHVRQ¶VPDQLSXODWLRQRIthe minds we construct for these characters can be 
seen to have significant effects for our ethical judgements of such scenes. In their 
psychological study, Gray, Gray and Wegner (2007) found that the attribution of 
mental-states DVVRFLDWHGZLWKµHxperience¶ (such as hunger, fear and pain) correlated 
ZLWKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶MXGJHPHQWVRIHQWLWLHVDVmoral patients ± LQ$ULVWRWOH¶VVHQVH± who 
might have right or wrong done to them. Meanwhile, attribution of states associated 
ZLWKµagency¶ (such as thought, planning and memory) correlated with judgements of 
them as moral agents, whose actions might be right or wrong. Applying such findings 
to I Am Legend, by reducing reader attributions of mind to Neville as an agent with 
intentions, beliefs and responsibility in (3), (4) and (5), their judgement of his actions as 
a moral agent might also be weakened. In the case of the female vampires, UHDGHUV¶ 
sense of WKHVHFKDUDFWHUV¶ ability to experience emotions and pain and thus hold rights 
as moral patients is also likely to be less prominent. Through this construal, I would 
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suggest, Matheson is therefore able to alleviate a potentially negative ethical judgement 
of Neville¶VDFWLRQV to some extent in readers.  
             However, as I have previously stated, readers also draw upon their individual 
knowledge as the basis of mind attributions. In addition, differences in motivation for 
effectance and empathy amongst perceivers also affect mind attribution (Waytz et al., 
2010). In these extractsGHWDLOVVXFKDVµWKLUW\\HDUVROG¶µKRXVHFRDW¶ µVPDOOEHG¶ (3), 
µPRWKHURIWZR¶ (5), DQGWKHREVHUYDWLRQWKDWµbXWIRUVRPHDIIOLFWLRQKHGLGQ¶W
understand these people were the same as he¶ (4) can be seen to invite an inferential 
fleshing out of these characters as human beings, and a degree of mind attribution in 
readers, which will vary according to their individual identity, motivations and 
attentional dispositions. The resulting experience for many readers, I would suggest, is a 
sense of the ethical turmoil reflected in 1HYLOOH¶VRZQWKRXJKWVµ,WZDVDOZD\VKDUG
when thH\ZHUHDOLYH¶µ:HOOZKDW else FDQ,GR"¶ (3) and the µWZLQJH¶ of guilt he 
suppresses (4). It is through such manipulations of mind attribution, I would argue, that 
readers are encouraged to empathise with Neville, and the psychological struggle he 
experiences, despite the ethically questionable nature of his actions. Differing in degree 
amongst readers, however, this conflict may contribute to the sense of discomfort 
expressed by readers VXFKDVµ*UDFH6¶VHHQHDUOLHU towards this invitation for empathy 
(Goodreads, 2014). Indeed, readers specifying the source of their dislike for Neville in 
his treatment of the female vampires (notably describing WKHVHFKDUDFWHUVDVµZRPHQ¶
and moral patients) lend support to this analysis: 
This sole survivor is a misogynistic man who seems to be dancing on the line of 
justifying rape, in addition to thinking of women as idiots who should be used. 
(Nisha Panchal, Goodreads, 2014) 
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the way he objectified the vampire women, that's just really not my thing.. 
(machinaheart, Goodreads, 2014) 
In general this was not a good book to be a woman in; whether human, vampire 
or somewhere in between. (Jennie, Goodreads, 2014) 
 
5.3 Group minds 
A further aspect of the WH[W¶VFRQVWUXDORI significance for mind attribution is the 
construal of the vampires as part of a group. For Palmer (2004, 2010, 2011) 
µLQWHUPHQWDOLW\¶RUWKLQNLQJWKDWLVµMRLQWJURXSVKDUHGRUFROOHFWLYH¶
representVDNH\DVSHFWRIµVRFLDOPLQGV¶DQGDVLJQLILFDQWµVHWRILQVWUXFWLRQV¶WREH
examined in fiction.  
This aspect of fictional minds can again be supported by drawing on empirical 
research in social psychology, where perception of groups of targets has been shown to 
result in attributions of µJURXSPLQG¶RUFROOHFWLYHmental-states (Bloom and Veres, 
1999). Furthermore, in recent work, the perceived µHQWLWDWLYLW\¶RUFRKHVLYHQHVV of such 
groups, manipulated in terms of gestalt properties such as similarity, proximity and 
common fate, has been found to affect the degree to which a group and its members are 
attributed minds (Morewedge et al., 2013). The relationship between these two kinds of 
mind attribution UHIOHFWVDµWUDGH-RII¶ ZKHUHE\µWKHPRUHDJURXSLVDWWULEXWHGDJURXS
PLQGWKHOHVVPHPEHUVRIWKDWJURXSDUHDWWULEXWHGLQGLYLGXDOPLQGVDQGYLFHYHUVD¶
(Waytz and Young, 2012: 83). One explanation for this phenomenon is again rooted in 
attention. Groups perceived as a single, cohesive unit or gestalt, it is proposed, are 
processed holistically, with reduced attention to individual members (Morewedge et al., 
2013: 1196). By manipulating the gestalt properties of groups both visually and 
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verbally, Waytz and Young (2012) were able to manipulate attributions of mind, and the 
associated ethical judgements of groups as moral agents.  
In I Am Legend, 3DOPHU¶VµODUJHLQWHUPHQWDOXQLW¶FDWHJRU\PXVWEH
dramatically extended. Here, the entire population of Earth is presented ± at least 
initially ± as a homogenous group, with the single shared intention of killing Neville. In 
extracts (1) and (2), FROOHFWLYHUHIHUHQFHVWRWKHYDPSLUHVDVµWKH\¶DQGWKHVXPPHG
conceptualisation of their collective movements and mental-states, µtheir snarling and 
fighting among themselves¶ µWKH\ZHUHDOOKHUHIRUWKHVDPHWKLQJ¶, reflects the wider 
construal of these vampires as a single agentive unit. This is foregrounded in the text by 
a PLOLWDU\PHWDSKRUµWKHGDUNILJXUHVVWRRGOLNHVLOHQWVROGLHUVRQGXW\¶0DWKHVRQ
µDEDWWDOLRQRIEORRGVXFNHUV¶p. 24). Also notable is the tendency to construe 
the vampires that Neville intends to stake, burn or experiment on, as part of such a 
group. At the start of extract (3), the woman and child are conceptualised as a group 
prior to their individuation (µ7KHUHZHUHWZRRIWKHP¶), and it is the vampire children as 
DFROOHFWLYHµWKH\¶ZKRµDOZD\VORRNOLNH.DWK\¶. Similarly, when carrying out 
experiments on one woman, Neville thinks RIKHUDVµRQHRIWKHP¶:   
 
(6) 
$OOULJKWVKH¶VVXIIHULQJKHDUJXHGZLWKKLPVHOIEXWVKH¶Vone of them and 
VKH¶GJODGO\kill you LIVKHJRWWKHFKDQFH<RX¶YHJRWWRORRNDW LWWKDWZD\LW¶V
the only way. (Matheson, 2001: 34) 
 
Such a collective construal might be said to induce DµJURXS-member mind trade 
RII¶LQreaders (Waytz & Young, 2012), whereby WKHSHUFHSWLRQRIDµJURXSPLQG¶IRU
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the vampires reduces our attention to the mental-states of the individuals involved. In 
cognitive-grammatical terms this construal might be understood as involving an 
increase in the µprominence¶ of the group relative to its individual participants, as part of 
a basic reversible figure-ground relationship. This linguistic manipulation of mind 
attribution again has consequences for our empathetic and ethical experiences of such 
scenes. By reducing attention to the individual vampire¶s suffering in extract (6), this 
collective construal could be said to alleviate UHDGHUV¶HWKLFDOMXGJHPHQWVLQYLWLQJWKHP 
to empathise with Neville and his terrible circumstances, as opposed to his victim.  
This construal might also be said to contribute to the sense of µVXVSHQVH¶DQG
µIHDU¶GLVFXVVHGSUHYLRXVO\. The presentation of targets as an entitative group has been 
shown to increase the application of stereotypical knowledge in the process of mind 
attribution (Dasgupta et al., 1999; Hamilton et al., 2004). In addition to the vampire 
schema, likely to hold negative associations of evil for most readers, this collective 
construal may also evoke our VWHUHRW\SHGSHUFHSWLRQRIJURXSVLQJHQHUDODVµcapable of 
WKUHDWKDWHDQGUHWDOLDWLRQHYHQLQWKHDEVHQFHRIGLDJQRVWLFLQIRUPDWLRQ¶'DVJXSWDHW
al., 1999: 1000). In this text, Matheson draws explicitly upon such general tendencies of 
group mind attribution in his development of the military metaphor (2001: 106-109). 
7DNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKHQRYHO¶V&ROG:DUFRQWH[WWKHH[WUDSRODWLRQRI µordinary, 
reDOLVWLFDQ[LHWLHV¶in relation to recognisable groups within society (Clasen, 2010: 314) 
can be seen to give 0DWKHVRQ¶VLPDJLQHGIXWXUHits horrific impact for readers at the 
time of its production, and today still. 
 
5.4 The twist 
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Finally, through its manipulation of mind attribution, the novel sets readers up for its 
final twist. The final chapters of the novel reveal that far from being the mindless 
entities suggested by their focalised construal, the vampires are thinking, feeling beings 
with complex motivations, fear and beliefs. In the final pages of the novel, we are 
confronted, alongside Neville, with the rich minds of these characters:  
 
(7) 
They all stood looking up at him with their white faces. He stared back. And 
VXGGHQO\KHWKRXJKW,¶PWKHDEQRUPDORQHQRZ1RUPDOF\ZDV a majority 
concept, the standard of many and not the standard of just one man. 
     Abruptly that realization joined with what he saw on their faces ± awe, fear, 
shrinking horror ± and he knew that they were afraid of him. To them he was 
some terrible scourge they had never seen, a scourge even worse than the disease 
they had come to live with. He was an invisible spectre who had left for 
evidence of his existence the bloodless bodies of their loved ones. And he 
understood what they felt and did not hate them. 
(«) 
Full circle. A new terror born in death, a new superstition entering the 
unassailable fortress of forever. 
    I am legend. (Matheson, 2001: 160) 
 
In this conclusion, the attentional construal of the fictional world is dramatically shifted, 
as Matheson reverses its perspective in a radical realignment of figure and ground. 
Having been invited to conceptualise the fictional world up to this point with the 
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VWDQGDUGRIWKLVµRQHPDQ¶DVWKHprominent subject of our conception, these closing 
paragraphs invite readers to re-conceptualise this world from the perspective of the 
vampires. In this new subjective construal, it is the vampires who are prominent, and it 
is their lack of mind attribution for Neville, and their resulting uncertainty and fear that 
we are now invited to recognise. &RPLQJµIXOOFLUFOH¶IURPthe opening chapter, Neville 
is now an attenuated µVSHFWUH¶DQG µOHJHQG¶, just like the myth or vampire schema which 
readers have been invited to draw upon during reading. Significantly, it is through an 
appreciation of the rich mental lives of these vampires, enabled for the first time by 
attention to the mental-state cues in their faces, which brings about this empathetic 
understanding in Neville, and which we are invited to share as readers.  
            Having invited readers to empathise with Neville throughout, this ending 
emphasises the ethical importance of empathising with both Neville and the vampires in 
reading the text. Indeed, these two perspectives come together to create the 
defamiliarising statement that forms both the title and closing lineµ,DPOegend.¶ By 
PDQLSXODWLQJUHDGHUV¶DWWULEXWLRQVRIPLQGWKURXJKWKHOLQJXLVWLFFKRLFHVPDGHLn its 
construal, however, 0DWKHVRQ¶VQRYHO invites readers to overlook these other minds to 
some degree during reading, and draw upon their pre-existing expectations and fears in 
relation to group minds. In doing so, the novel raises the variable degree to which we 
attribute minds to others in our everyday lives for critical examination. 
            Finally, this conclusion lends the construal of the vampires identified across the 
extracts examined here, and the limited mind attribution it consistently invites, a further 
interpretative significance. Once attributed to the flawed perspective of Neville, this 
construal, and its resulting pattern of mind attribution, can be identified as part of a 
µPLQGVW\OH¶IRUWKLVFKDUDFWHUGHILQHGE\)RZOHUDVWKHµLPSUHVVLRQRIDZRUOGYLHZ¶
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FUHDWHGE\µ>F@XPXODWLYHO\FRQVLVWHQWVWUXFWXral options, agreeing in cutting the 
presented world to one patteUQRUDQRWKHU¶)RZOHU6). In her development of 
this notion, Semino (2002) applies cognitive theories LQRUGHUWRVSHFLI\WKHµFRQFHSWXDO
VWUXFWXUHVDQGFRJQLWLYHKDELWV¶ZKLFKPDNHup character worldviews (p.95). In the 
extracts considered here, limited engagement with the minds of the vampires can be 
interpreted as a distinctive cognitive habit for Neville, and one which can be associated 
with both his restricted understanding in the early parts of the novel, and his increasing 
need to alleviate a negative ethical judgement of himself, or feeling of guilt, as his 
understanding develops. While critical readers such as those identified at the end of 
section 5.2 may recognise this mind style during a first reading of the text, for a large 
proportion of readers, I would suggest, WKHDWWULEXWLRQRIWKLVFRQVWUXDOWR1HYLOOH¶Vmind 
style will emerge during their second reading, as part of a radically altered experience of 
this character and the vampires he plagues. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this article, I have explored the stylistic manipulation of reader mind attribution for 
the vampires in 5LFKDUG0DWKHVRQ¶VI Am Legend. 7KRXJKH[WHUQDOO\IRFDOLVHGUHDGHUV¶
understanding of these fictional minds, and more specifically, its strategic limitation at 
key points in the narrative, was said to contribute to the establishment of an empathetic 
relationship with its main character-focaliser, and the maintenance of this (sometimes 
uncomfortable) relationship DVWKLVFKDUDFWHU¶VDFWLRQVDUHUDLVHGIRUHWKLFDOTXHVWLRQLQJ. 
Finally, it was suggested that this limited mind attribution, brought about by various 
aspects of the YDPSLUHV¶construal, may contribute to the presentation of a distinctive 
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mind style for Neville, reflecting his engagement with other minds as part of his 
conceptualisation of the fictional world. 
In the course of this analysis I have shown how empirical research on the subject 
RIµPLQGDWWULEXWLRQ¶LQVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\can be applied to our experiences of fictional 
characters. While the mechanics of this processing, or Theory of Mind, remain a matter 
of debate within the cognitive sciences, I have suggested that beneficial insights for 
literary study might be drawn from empirical research into the factors affecting this 
process, and its consequences.  
This analysis has also explored the use of Cognitive Grammar as a stylistic tool 
for the application of such research to narrative. For Rundquist (2014)3DOPHU¶V
proposed broadening of the narratological study of fictional minds is a departure from 
the principled linguistic focus of literary stylistics. As I hope to have demonstrated, 
application of the concept of µVRFLDOPLQGV¶does not entail a departure from stylistics 
since, like the categories of thought representation, the cues for their construction during 
reading can be analysed linguistically. Through its fundamental link between language 
and cognition, Cognitive Grammar, I have argued, offers an effective framework for the 
interdisciplinary study of fictional minds. 
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Note 
1. All quotes from Goodreads throughout the article are reproduced as they appeared on 
the site. According to its Terms and Conditions, Goodreads does not claim any 
ownership rights on content posted and users are advised that they are placing the 
content in a public area. 
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